Battle of the Sexes: Non-Cooperative Games in the Theory of the Family

K.E. Lommerund
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kjell Erik Lommerud ()

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: We look at private-provision-of-public goods games. These games share an assumption that family members non-cooperatively use their resources either to acquire a private good or a family-specific good. What exactly constitutes the "private good" and the "public good" will be seen to vary from model to model. The next section suggests that the type of non-cooperative model presented earlier can be used to reformulate the Nash bargaining theory of the household.

Keywords: FAMILY; GAMES; EFFICIENCY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H41 J12 J13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:174

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