Learning Equilibrium Play: a Myopic Approach

Sjur Flåm

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: We model repeated play of noncooperative stage games in terms of approximate gradient steps. That simple format require little information and no optimization. Moreover, it allows players to evaluate marginal cost or profit inexactly and to move with different velocities. Uncertainty can also be accomodated. Granted some crucial stability, we show that play converges to Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:189

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