Common Agency with Outside Options; the Case of International Taxation of an MNE

Trond Olsen and Petter Osmundsen

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: A multinational enterprise is subject to taxation by two jurisdictions who compete to capture its rents, while being aware that the firm also has investment options outside these jurisdictions. The firm has private informatio about its efficiency. We show that a higher outside option for the firm may actually be beneficial for the taxing countries when they compete.

Keywords: INFORMATION; TAXATION; COMPETITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H21 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:1999

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