Production Games under Uncertainty

M. Sandsmark

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: The main objects below are transferable-utility games in which each agent faces an optimization problem, briefly called production planning, constrained by his resource endowment. Coalitions can pool members's resources. Such production games are here extended to accomodate uncertainty about events not known ex ante.

Keywords: UNCERTAINTY; GAME THEORY; PRODUCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:204

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