Repeated Play and Newton's Method

Sjur Flåm

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: Motivated by repeated play of non-cooperative games, we study equation solving undertaken in parallel by several non-communicating agents, each dealing with his own block of variables. The process is akin to Newton's method in using derivative information. It does, however, proceed without matrix inversion and dispenses with the need to exchange information between various blocks.

Keywords: GAMES; INFORMATION; MOTIVATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:218

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