Foreign Direct Investment, Intra-firm Trade and Ownership Structure

Kai Konrad and Kjell Lommerud ()

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: Asymmetric information about true opportunity cost in trade between a multinational and its foreign affiliate can alleviate the hold-up problem in foreign direct investment. Selling shares in the affiliate to locals is also beneficial because it increase the parent multinational's information rent that is protected from a host government's confiscatory taxation.

Keywords: FOREIGN INVESTMENTS; TRADE; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 F34 G15 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (51)

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Journal Article: Foreign direct investment, intra-firm trade and ownership structure (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:219

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