A New and Robust Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Triadic Power Relations
Magnus Hatlebakk ()
Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen
We present a new subgame perfect equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game, which has Basu's triadic model as the stage game. The payoff for the laborer is the same as in Basu's model. The equilibrium is more robust than the solution in Naqvi and Wemhoner in the sense that the equilibrium does not require the same high degree of rationality; simple well-known strategies are applied, and both the lanklord and the merchant are better of than in the stage game.
Keywords: GAMES; LABOUR; POWER GENERATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 O12 Q12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
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Journal Article: A new and robust subgame perfect equilibrium in a model of triadic power relations (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:2400
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More papers in Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
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