Why Dowries?

Maristella Botticini and Aloysius Siow ()

Boston University - Institute for Economic Development from Boston University, Institute for Economic Development

Abstract: When married daughters leave their parental home and their married brothers do not, altruistic parents provide dowries for daughters and bequests for sons in order to solve a free riding problem between their married sons and daughters. The theory has predictions on the form of the dowry contract, the effect of family demographics on the value of the dowry, and the decline of dowries in previously dowry giving societies. The theory is consistent with cross-section dowry data from medieval Italy. It is also consistent with the factors that eld to the decline of dowries in Sao Paulo, Brazil.

Date: 1999-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Why Dowries? (2003)
Working Paper: Why Dowries? (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bosecd:95

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