The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design

Zvika Neeman ()

Working Papers from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: A number of recent results in mechanism design literature show that in virutally all mechanism design environments of interest, as long as agents' private information is correlated. It is possible to design mechanisms that leave agents with arbitrarily small information rents. Thus, while agents may possess exclusive private information, it is irrelevant for the purpose of normative economic analysis, since it is still always possible to implement any outcome as if the agent's private information was commonly known. This paper presents a critique of these results.

Keywords: PUBLIC GOODS; INFORMATION; AUCTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Journal Article: The relevance of private information in mechanism design (2004)
Working Paper: The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostec:93

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