Network Incentives in Managed Health Care
Ching-to Ma () and
Working Papers from Boston University - Department of Economics
This paper introduces a theory of network incentives in managed health care. Participation in the plan's "network" confers an economic benefit on providers; in example, the plan expects compliance with its protocols. The network sets a target for the number of outpatient visits in an episode of care. A provider failing to satisfy the target may be penalized by the paln's attempt to direct patients to other providers within its network. There is an equilibrium in which every provider in the networlk uses the target.
Keywords: HEALTH; NETWORK ANALYSIS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C45 I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Network Incentives in Managed Health Care (2002)
Working Paper: Network Incentives in Managed Health Care (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostec:94
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