Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability

Douglas Gale () and R.W. Rosental

Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Abstract: In this paper we model the dynamic interaction of two types of agents, experimenters and imitators, whose behavior is characterized by simple rules of thumb. The agents repeatedly play a one-shot game in which the agent's actions are strategic substitutes.

Keywords: ECONOMIC MODELS; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C79 D50 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability (1999)
Working Paper: Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostin:65

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().