A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure

Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra

Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Abstract: We study endogenous coalition formation in contexts where individual (and group) payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure that might form. We capture potential interaction across coalitions by means of a partition function.

Keywords: GAMES; GAME THEORY; OLIGOPOLIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C72 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 72 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures (1999)
Working Paper: A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures (1998)
Working Paper: A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostin:68

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().