Competition and Incentives with Non-Exclusive Contracts

Charles Kahn and Dilip Mookherjee

Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Abstract: We consider a model in which customers sequentially negotiate nonexclusive credit or insurance contracts from multiple risk-neutral firms in a market with free entry. Each contract is subject to moral hazard arising from a common noncontractible effort decision.

Keywords: CONTRACTS; COMPETITION; INSURANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D81 G22 K10 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1996
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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts (1998)
Working Paper: Competition and Incentives with Non-Exclusive Contracts (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostin:75

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