Termination and Coordination in Partnerships

D. Minehart and Zvika Neeman ()

Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Abstract: It is common practice for firms to pool their expertise by forming parterships such as joint ventures and strategic alliances. A Central organizational problem in such parterships is that managers may behave noncooperatively in order to advance the interests of their parent firms. We ask whether contracts can be designed so that managers will maximize total profits.

Keywords: ENTERPRISES; PARTNERSHIPS; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 D23 D44 D82 L14 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1997
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Journal Article: Termination and Coordination in Partnerships (1999)
Working Paper: Termination and Coordination in Partnerships (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostin:83

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