Cost and Quantity Invcentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers
Ching-to Ma ()
Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme
This paper compares the cost and quality incentive effects of cost reimbursement and prospective payment systems in the health industru when providers are altuistic. Provider's behavioral rule is governed by a desire to maximize a weighted sum of profit and consumers' health benefit.
Keywords: COSTS; DUMPTING; HEALTH SERVICES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 I18 L10 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostin:84
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