Playing Hard to Get: Theory and Evidence on Layoffs, Recalls and Unemployment

Núria Rodriguez-Planas

Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Abstract: Given the importance of recall to previous employer in the United States, I provide both theoretical and empirical analyses of an asymmetric information model with an endogenous layoff-rehire process. I show that taking into account the possibility of recalls has important implications for the study of post-displacement earnings and unemployment duration of laid-off workers in the US. I find that high-productivity laid-off workers may choose unemployment over a low paid job, even though they may not be recalled.

Keywords: UNEMPLOYMENT; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 J60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Chapter: Playing Hard to Get: Theory and Evidence on Layoffs, Recalls, and Unemployment (2014)
Working Paper: Playing Hard to Get: Theory and Evidence on Layoffs, Recalls and Unemployment (1998)
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