 Changes in the Employment Contract? Evidence from a Quasi-ExperimentG. Chaness and David Levine Working Papers from California Berkeley - Institute of Industrial Relations Abstract: Many authors have discussed an apparent shift to a new employment contract characterized by less commitment between employer and employee coupled with closer ties between wages within the enterprise and those in the external labor market. We study the issue of when people in the U.S. and Canada feel pay cuts are fair, comparing our results with those of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986). In contrast to much previous discussion, we find no evidence of increasing acceptance of pay cuts--a measure of whether external, not internal, labor markets are considered fair. These results suggest that new organizational forms might do well to preserve some of the features of the "old" employment contract. Keywords: EMPLOYMENT; CONTRACTS (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calbir:70 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Papers from California Berkeley - Institute of Industrial Relations U.S.A.; University of california Berkeley, The Institute of Industrial Relations. 2521 Channing Way. Berkeley California 94520-5555. |
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