INCENTIVES AND RISK SHARING IN A STOCK MARKET EQUILIBRIUM

Michael Magill and Martine Quinzii

Department of Economics from California Davis - Department of Economics

Abstract: Economists hold two opposing views of the stock market: one focuses on the negative effect on incentives of separating ownership and control, the other emphasizes its beneficial role for risk sharing. Using a generalization of Diamond's model which incorporates the effect of entrepreneurial incentives, we show how these two views can be reconciled. We introduce the concept of a stock market equilibrium with rational competitive price perceptions (RCPP) and show that such and equilibrium leads to a constrained optimal trade-off between risk sharing and incentives. We give examples showing the difference between RCPP equilibria and the standard CAPM type equilibria of finance.

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Working Paper: Incentives and Risk Sharing in a Stock Market Equilibrium (2003)
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