A THEORY OF RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER COMPLETE IGNORANCE
Department of Economics from California Davis - Department of Economics
This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice under uncertainty for decision-makers whose preferences are exhaustively described by partial orders representing "limited information." Specifically, we consider the limiting case of "Complete Ignorance" decision problems characterized by maximally incomplete preferences and important primarily as reduced forms of general decision problems under uncertainty. "Rationality" is conceptualized in terms of a "Principle of Preference-Basedness," according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference. The main result characterizes axiomatically a new choice-rule called "Simultaneous Expected Utility Maximization" which in particular satisfies a choice-functional independence and a context-dependent choice-consistency condition; it can be interpreted as the fair agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the different possible states (respectively extermal priors in the general case).
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/97-2.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/97-2.pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:caldec:97-02
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Department of Economics from California Davis - Department of Economics University of California Davis - Department of Economics. One Shields Ave., California 95616-8578. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().