EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
Giacomo Bonanno () and
Department of Economics from California Davis - Department of Economics
We give an introduction to the literature on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts in game theory. Only normal-form games are considered. The solution concepts analyzed are rationalizability, strong rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. The analysis is carried out locally in terms of properties of the belief hierarchies. Several examples are used throughout to illustrate definitions and concepts.
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Working Paper: EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:caldec:97-21
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