Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms Against Threats Can Have Real Effects

Nejat Anbarci (), Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos ()

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set. In such settings, with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set, it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in terms of efficiency. We compare bargaining solutions within a class in which the influence of the threat point on the bargaining outcome varies across solutions.

Keywords: INVESTMENTS; COSTS; CONFLICTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D30 D70 D72 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2000
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Journal Article: Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calirv:00-01-19

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