Bureaucratic Creep

Amihai Glazer and L.S. Rothenberg

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: Although many complain that the clientele served by government programs routinely expands, there exists no analytic model with suggests how policy implementation may result in such growth. This paper shows that peer effects, where each bureaucrat compares his behavior or that of all others, can cause policy clientele to increase over time--what we label bureaucratic creep-- particularly when bureaucrats interact with many potential recipients.

Keywords: BUREAUCRACY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calirv:95-96-1

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