Taxation of Rent-Seeking Activities

Amihai Glazer and Kai Konrad

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: We consider taxes on firms which engage in rent-seeking contests. The taxes can be on realized profits or on rent-seeking expenditures, and the firms can engage in a context where either the hoghest bidder wins the prize, or else a firm's probability of winning equals the ratio of its expenditures to expenditures by all firms. We find the deadweight loss, and cause no reduction in the profits of firms.

Keywords: TAXES; ENTERPRISES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 1997
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Journal Article: Taxation of rent-seeking activities (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calirv:97-98-04

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