Complementarity in Contests
Stergios Skaperdas and
Constantinos Syropoulos ()
Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
Abstract:
To facilitate the study of contests in general equilibrium, we examine winner-take-all contests in which the prize is complemenatry to the effort of the contestants, as inputs are in production functions or final goods in utility functions. We focus on the effects of technological factors and endowments on the effort and the welfare of the contestants. Most of our findings differ considerably from the standard model of contestants in which prize and effort are independent.
Keywords: RENT; CONFLICTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D30 D70 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1998
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Journal Article: Complementarity in contests (1998) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calirv:97-98-21
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