Do Norms Against Threats have Real Effects? Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict

Nejat Anbarci (), Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos ()

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in "guns") that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set. In such settings, with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set, it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in term of their efficiency properties. We compare bargaining solutions within a wide class in which the influence of the threat point on the bargaining outcome varies across solutions.

Keywords: BARGAINING; GAME THEORY; SOCIAL CHOICE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D30 D70 D72 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calirv:98-99-11

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