Political Biases Against Public Investment and Growth

Amihai Glazer and M. Gradstein

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: Public investment can cause the preferences of the decisive voter in one period to differ from preferences of the decisive voter in an earlier period. Forward-looking voters may therefore vote against a policy that would increase the incomes of all persons. The effect may arise when increased public investment causes such a large increase in redistribution in future periods that the welfare of the decisive voter (or his descendants) in earlier periods declines.

Keywords: INVESTMENTS; PUBLIC EXPENDITURES; SOCIAL CHOICE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H54 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calirv:98-99-5

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