Allies as Rivals: Internal and External Rent Seeking

Amihai Glazer

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: A Manager of other leader can more effectively obtain rents or other benefits for his organization the higher the quality of his staff. But these same staff may seek rents within the firm, with the most able staff best able to do so. A Manager may therefore prefer to employ staff of low quality.

Keywords: MANAGEMENT; ENTERPRISES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M10 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1999
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Journal Article: Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calirv:99-00-10

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