Optimal Term Length when Misinformation Increases with Experience

Amihai Glazer

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: Consider an agent who collects information over time, but who imperfectly recalls the date at which he made each observation. If the state of nature changes over time, then the agent's performance may worsen with experience.

Keywords: INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calirv:99-00-25

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