Working Papers

From California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A..
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91-19: MARKET PROVISION ON CLUBS

A. Gylazer and E. Niskanen

91-18: WHY VOTERS MAY PREFER CONGESTED PUBLIC CLUBS

Amihai Glazer and E. Niskanen

91-17: The Economics of the Brass Paradox

Kai Konrad and Amihai Glazer

91-16: The Decision to Go Public, Accrued Capital Gains Taxation

Kai Konrad

91-15: INTERTEMPORALLY DEPENDENT PREFERENCE ORDERINGS IN AN EXPECTED UTILITY SETTING: GOLDEN RULE STRATEGIES FOR EDUCATIONAL ENDOWMENTS

S. Kassouf and Alan Lewis

91-14: BOOTSTRAPPING UNCONDITIONAL SAMPLING DISTRIBUTIONS OF STEIN-RULE SELECTIONS PROCEDURES

David Brownstone

91-13: THE EVALUATION OF RISKY PROJECTS BY VOTERS

Amihai Glazer and Kai Konrad

91-12: DELAY IN POLICY

Amihai Glazer

91-11: COMMITMENT PROBLEMS JUSTIFY SUBSIDIES FOR MEDICAL INSURANCE

Amihai Glazer and E. Niskanen

91-10: ON THE INCENTIVES TO ESTABLISH AND PLAY RENT-SEEKING GAMES

Amihai Glazer

91-09: IMPERFECT INFORMATION MY ALLEVIATE AGENCY PROBLEMS

T. Cowen and Amihai Glazer

91-08: POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM UNDER GROUP IDENTIFICATION

Amihai Glazer

91-07: OUTPUT, CAPITAL, AND LABOR IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUN: EVIDENCE FROM SPECTRAL ANALYSIS

Daniel Levy

91-06a: COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND POWER IN THE ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Stergios Skaperdas

91-05: CONFLICT AND ATTITUDES TOWARD RISK

Stergios Skaperdas

91-04: INVESTMENT-SAVING COMOVEMENT, CAPITAL MOBILITY, AND FISCAL POLICY

Daniel Levy

91-03: INPERFECT POLICY FORMATION AND TIME INCONSISTENCY

Daniel Klein and B. O'Flaherty

91-02: MEAN INDEPENDENCE AND UNCORRELATEDNESS

C.S. Hong and L.F. Herk

91-01: INERTIA, RISK SPREADING, AND THE ARROW-LIND THEOREM

C.S. Hong and L.F. Herk

90-6: POLICY PROPOSALS UNDER CONTESTABILITY

Amihai Glazer

90-5: JOB TENURE AND JOBLESSNESS OF DISPLACED WORKERS

Robert Valletta

90-4: BANKRUPTCY AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA: A COORDINATION FAILURE IN THE FINANCIAL MARKET

G. Mossetti

90-4a: MYOPIA, MISPERCEPTIONS, AND SOCIAL SECURITY

Amihai Glazer and E. Niskanen

90-3: HOW TO "DATA MINE" IF YOU MUST: BOOTSTRAPPING STEIN-RULE MODEL SELECTION PROCEDURES

David Brownstone

90-2: COOPERATION THROUGH COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT: A MODEL OF CREDIT BUREAUS

Daniel Klein

90-1: S-GAME, OR TIME INCONSISTENCY AND ALL THAT

Daniel Klein and B. O'Flaherty

89-11: SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL

L. Cohen and Roger Noll

89-08: THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS? THE TURNPIKE COMPANIES OF EARLY AMERICA

Daniel Klein

89-6: MOTION PICTURE ANTITRUST: THE PARAMOUNT CASES REVISITED

R.D. Eckert and A. de Vany

89-5: THEORY OF PARKING

Amihai Glazer

89-4: AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES

Amihai Glazer

89-3: HOW TO "DATA MINE" IF YOU MUST: BOOTSTRAD-PING PRETEST AND STEIN-RULE ESTIMATORS

David Brownstone

89-2: AGGREGATE OUTPUT, CAPITAL, AND LABOR IN THE POST-WAR U.S. ECONOMY

Daniel Levy

88-07: TURNOUT AND THE RATIONAL VOTER MODEL

Amihai Glazer and B. Grofman

88-06: CANDIDATES SHOULD AVOID SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS IF VOTERS ARE IGNORANT

Amihai Glazer

88-05: OPTIMAL SALES TO CONSUMERS WHO HOLD INVENTORY

Amihai Glazer and R. Hassin

88-04: WHY REPRESENTATIVES ARE IDEOLOGISTS THOUGH VOTERS ARE NOT

Amihai Glazer and B. Grofman

88-03: THE SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE UNDER MAJORITY VOTING

Amihai Glazer

88-02: THE EFFECT OF POLITICS ON FIRMS' PRICING DECISIONS: REGULATION VIA THREATS

S. Erfle and H. McMillan