Multilateral Bargaining With Imperfect Information

Sandeep Baliga () and Roberto Serrano

Working Papers from Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals

Keywords: information; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1993
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Journal Article: Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information (1995)
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