The Not-So-Secret Agent: Professional Monitors, Hierarchies and Implementation

Sandeep Baliga ()

Working Papers from Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals

Keywords: information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1995
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Journal Article: The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation (2002)
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