Incomplete Markets and the Firm

E. Dierker, H. Dierker and B. Grobal
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Egbert Dierker

Working Papers from Carleton - School of Public Administration

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the welfare properties of the set of Drèze equilibria for economies with incomplete markets and firms. The well known fact that a Drèze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto optimal is often attributed to a lack of coordination between firms. We show that there are economies with a single firm in which no Drèze equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient. Even a unique Drèze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto efficient.

Keywords: ENTERPRISES; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D50 D60 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Incomplete Markets and the Firm (1999)
Working Paper: Incomplete Markets and the Firm (1999)
Working Paper: Incomplete Markets and the Firm (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:carlad:99-03

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