Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel

Rafael Repullo and Javier Suarez

Working Papers from Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-

Abstract: This paper considers a model of firms' financing based on the existence of a moral hazard problem in the choice of investment projects by a heterogeneous population of entrepreneurs. Two alternative ways of funding these projects, called unmonitored (or market) and monitored (or bank) lending, are analyzed.

Keywords: MODELS; MORAL HAZARD; BANKS; MONEY; MONETARY POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E44 E50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: A model of the credit channel (2000)
Working Paper: Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel (1999)
Working Paper: Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: a model of the credit channel (1999)
Working Paper: Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:cemfdt:9604

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