Relationships Between Politicians and Voters Through Elections: a Review Essay

Juan Carlos Berganza ()

Working Papers from Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-

Abstract: This paper surveys the literature on the most fundamental institution in a democracy: the appointment of the policymakers through democratic elections. Elections perform at least three different functions: (i) to discipline the elected officials by the threat of not being reappointed; (ii) to select competent individuals for public office; and (iii) to aggregate and represent the voters' conflicting preferences. We also review the literature on political business cycles. The essay is not meant to be just a review of what has been done in the past, although that is part of the motivation and development. Rather, it is meant to describe a series of productive and useful lines of research, lines that are likely to expand our understanding of the underlying political and economic behavior.

Keywords: ELECTIONS; VOTING; SOCIAL CHOICE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:cemfdt:9809

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