Political Ownership

M. Bennedsen

Working Papers from Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Danmark-

Abstract: Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. I analyze how the influence externality arising from the interest groups' lobby activity disables the Coase Theorem. Then I proceed to investigate how the allocation of property rights between a government and a group of private owners determines the equilibrium allocation of resources in a firm. In other words, I provide a theory of why ownership matters.

Keywords: OWNERSHIP; POLITICS Aarhus C, Danmark. 29p. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L2 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:clmsre:98-09

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