The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among Small and Large Banks

Nicholas Economides (), Robert Hubbard and D. Palia

Working Papers from Columbia - Graduate School of Business

Keywords: POLITICAL ECONOMY; INSURANCE; BANKS; MONOPOLIES; FINANCIAL MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 G20 G21 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks (1996)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks (1995)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among Small and Large Banks (1993)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:colubu:95-14

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