Beat'Em Or Join'Em? Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets

J. Peter Neary and Paul O'Sullivan ()

Working Papers from College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-

Abstract: This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete.

Keywords: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; TRADE POLICY; EXPORTS; SUBSIDIES; OLIGOPOLIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 H20 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Beat 'em or Join 'em? Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets (1999)
Working Paper: Beat Em or Join Em: Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets (1998)
Working Paper: Beat 'Em or Join 'Em?: Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets (1998)
Working Paper: Beat 'em or join 'em: export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets (1998)
Working Paper: Beat 'em or Join 'em?: Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:dublec:98/10

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from College Dublin, Department of Political Economy- Ireland; University College Dublin, Department of Political Economy, Centre for Economic Research, Belfield, Dublin 4. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().