Worker's Wages and Payments to Union Officials: A Principal-Agent Model of Trade Unions and Workers

Kevin Denny

Working Papers from College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-

Abstract: This paper models the relationship between the union and its membership as a Principal Agent problem. The union sets wages subject to a labour demand curve. The level of wages is determined by union effort. The union negotiates as a monopoly union. Its utility is a risk averse function of its salary and effort. Ths workforce determines a contract for the union negotiator which is a function of the wages bargaindes and other workers wages.

Keywords: WORKERS' REPRESENTATION; WAGES; PAYROLL TAX (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:dublec:98/17

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from College Dublin, Department of Political Economy- Ireland; University College Dublin, Department of Political Economy, Centre for Economic Research, Belfield, Dublin 4. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().