Product Preannouncement, Market Cannibalization and Price Competition

D. Manceau and Francis Bloch

Working Papers from Ecole Superieure de Commerce de Paris. Groupe ESCP-

Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze the firms' incentives to preannounce their new products. We consider a two-period model where a single firm controls the market with one product in the first period and a new and better product is introduced in the second period, either by the same firm or by a new entrant on the market. In the single firm case, a preannouncement cannibalizes the sales of the old product in the first period.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D21 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:ecsucp:98/136

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