Optimal Bidding in Takeover Contests

P. Cornu

Working Papers from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-

Abstract: The optimal bidding strategy for the initial bidder in takeover contests is investigated. IN the model, the initial bidder has the choice between making a low or a high preemptive initial bid. Both type of bid can lead to a competitive auction process among bidders, and both information and bidding costs are included in the analysis. Optimal strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.

Keywords: TAKEOVERS; BIDDING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:ehecge:98.17

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