The Nonorthodox Currency Boards: The Case of Bulgaria

Nikolay Nenovsky () and Kalin Hristov ()

Working Papers from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-

Abstract: In recent years a number of countries have introduced currency boards (CB). The new generation currency boards, which is gaining swing and popularity, preserves to different degrees the central bank's ability to perform the lender of last resort function (LOLR) and leaves room for intervention in case of systemic risk. Central bank flexibility was preserved in different forms in HongKong, Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria. The major questions that need answers are: (1) which are the new channels of monetary policy; (2) does an orthodox self-regulating mechanism work with second generation currency boards; (3) how are disequilibria in the economy adjusted? The theoretical hypotheses presented are checked empirically based on Bulgarian data.

Keywords: CURRENCIES; CENTRAL BANKS; RISK (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 F31 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: The Nonorthodox Currency Boards: The Case of Bulgaria (2001)
Working Paper: The Nonorthodox Currency Boards: The Case of Bulgaria (2001)
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