Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets

Georges Dionne (), N. Doherty and N. Fombaron

Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques.

Abstract: In this survey we present some of the more significant results in the literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. Sections 1 and 2 introduce the subject and section 3 discusses the monopoly model developed by Stiglitz (1977) for the case of single-period contracts and extended by many authors to the multi-period case.

Keywords: MONOPOLIES; ADVERSE SELECTION; INSURANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D81 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets (2000)
Working Paper: Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:etcori:00-05

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