Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Markets

Georges Dionne (), Christian Gourieroux and C. Vanasse

Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques.

Abstract: In this paper, we propose an empirical analysis of the presence of adverse selection in an insurance market. We first present a theroetical model of a market with adverse selection and we introduce different issues related to transaction costs, accident costs, risk aversion and moral hazard. We then discuss an econometric modeling based on latent variables and we derive its relationship with specification in the portfolio of an insurer.

Keywords: ADVERSE SELECTION; INSURANCE; RISK; TRANSACTION COSTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Markets (1998)
Working Paper: Evidence of adverse selection in automobile insurance markets (1998)
Working Paper: Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Markets (1998)
Working Paper: Evidence of adverse selection in automobile insurance markets (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:etcori:98-09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques. Canada; ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES COMMERCIALES(H.E.C.),3000, chemin de la Cote-Sainte-Catherine. Montreal (Quebec) Canada H3T 2A7.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().