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Reflexion sur l'optimalite des contrats d'assurance

S. Spaeter

Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques.

Abstract: This paper deals with the economic and technical impact of the insurance constraint on the optimal insurance contracts. We show that restricting the set of admissible indemnity fucntions to those that do not allow fo indemnities larger than the damage does not invalidate the Pareto-optimality of the policies obtained with a strictly positive marginal cost of insurance. Besides, if the administrative costs borne by the insurer only comprised fixed costs, over-insurance may be a better solution in some environments with two positively correlated risks. This study takes place in an economy without information asymmetry.

Keywords: INSURANCE; CONTRACTS; COSTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:etcori:98-10

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