Full Pooling in Multi-Period Contracting with Adverse Selection and Noncommitment

Georges Dionne () and Claude Fluet

Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques.

Abstract: This paper analyses multi-period regulation on procurement policies under asymmetric information between the regulator firms.

Keywords: INCENTIVES; CONTRACTS; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment (1999)
Working Paper: Full Pooling in Multi-Period Contracting with Adverse Selection and Noncommitment (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:etcori:99-04

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