An Axiomatic Approach to the Concept of Interaction Among Players in Cooperative Games

Michel Grabisch and M. Roubens

Liege - Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie from UNIVERSITE DE LIEGE, Faculte d'economie, de gestion et de sciences sociales, Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie

Abstract: An axiomatization of the interactions between the palyers of any coalition is given. It is based on three axioms: linearity, dummy and symmetry. These interaction indices extend the Banzhaf and Shapley values when using in addition two equivalent recursive axioms. Lastly, the authors give an expression of the Banzhaf and Shapely interaction indices in terms of pseudo-Boolean functions.

Keywords: GAME; THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1998
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Journal Article: An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gemame:9818

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