Is It Legitimate to Encourage Work Sharing?

N. Maderner and Jean Rochet

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: We study a generalization of Mirrlees' income taxation model in which qualifications of workers are both endogenous and observable by the government. Individuals differ by their inobservable abilities, which affect simultaneously their disutility of labor and their cost of training. In general the optimal tax schedule does not only depend on income but also on its "components", namely wage rate (or qualification) and labor supply. We find conditions under which it is optimal to subsidize lower qualifications or to encourage work sharing.

Keywords: LABOUR MARKET; MANPOWER; HUMAN RESOURCES; UNEMPLOYMENT; INCOME (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J20 J21 J30 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:96.404

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse I Place Anatole France 31042 - Toulouse CEDEX France.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().