Consumer Strategies Limiting The Monopolist's Power: Collusion And Multiple Purchase

I. Brundin

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: The classical price (quantity) discrimination model relies on the assumption that the consumers can neither buy more than one bundle each, nor resell the goods to each other. This assumption is lifted. In a two-type context, the consumers' set strategy is enlarged, first to allow for multiple purchase by one consumer, then to allow for collusion among consumers.

Keywords: MONOPOLIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:96.440

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