Auctions and the Dynamics of Corruption

Marco Celentani () and Juan-José Ganuza

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: Organizations require discretionary decision making to be delegated and to be under only partial scrutiny from supervisors. This introduces the possibility for agents to use their discretionary power to their own advantage and in detriment to the organization. We model this situation by considering an agent who is supposed to employ a prespecified value function in order to evaluate offers in a procurement process in which the quality of the product or service being offered matters as well as its price.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; CORRUPTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D46 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:97.459

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