Regulatory Trade-Offs in the Design of Concession Contracts
Claude Crampes () and
Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ
The paper discusses how conflicts between the multiple objectives of policymakers (efficiency, equity, fiscal, speed of reform, signaling...) can influence the optimal design of concessions contracts for network services in infrastructure. The discussion covers the relevance of information asymmetries of the optimal regulatory regime and processes, for the optimal design of awarding processes and for the optimal duration of the contracts. It also adresses the de sign of pricing in relation withthe universal service obligation. It concludes with an illustration of the preceding economic principles with some stylized facts from the liberalization experiment in Argentina.
Keywords: REGULATION; FINANCIAL MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G38 G10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
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Journal Article: Regulatory trade-offs in the design of concession contracts (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:97.462
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