EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Regulatory Trade-Offs in the Design of Concession Contracts

Claude Crampes () and Antonio Estache

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: The paper discusses how conflicts between the multiple objectives of policymakers (efficiency, equity, fiscal, speed of reform, signaling...) can influence the optimal design of concessions contracts for network services in infrastructure. The discussion covers the relevance of information asymmetries of the optimal regulatory regime and processes, for the optimal design of awarding processes and for the optimal duration of the contracts. It also adresses the de sign of pricing in relation withthe universal service obligation. It concludes with an illustration of the preceding economic principles with some stylized facts from the liberalization experiment in Argentina.

Keywords: REGULATION; FINANCIAL MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G38 G10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Regulatory trade-offs in the design of concession contracts (1998) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:97.462

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse I Place Anatole France 31042 - Toulouse CEDEX France.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().

 
Page updated 2020-07-01
Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:97.462